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International and Intranational
Market Segmentation and
Integration in West Africa
Jenny C. Aker, Michael W. Klein, and
Stephen A. O’Connell

6.1

Introduction

What muffles, or amplifies, the voice of the Walrasian auctioneer? This
question is of more than theoretical interest since a common policy goal is
fostering market integration, especially across international borders. The
welfare benefits of policies that succeed in integrating cross-border markets
are likely to be greater in low-income countries, especially the landlocked
countries of sub-Saharan Africa, than in industrial countries. But can government policies like tariff reductions actually increase market integration in
the presence of political or social barriers that impede trade? Can regional
investments in transport infrastructure help create unified markets in the
face of corruption at the border? Put more simply, do borders pose a significant challenge to market integration in sub-Saharan Africa? Or does
the Walrasian auctioneer have as clear and loud a voice across countries in
sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere?
Jenny C. Aker is associate professor of development economics at the Fletcher School at
Tufts University. Michael W. Klein is the William L. Clayton Professor of International Economic Affairs at the Fletcher School at Tufts University and a research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Stephen A. O’Connell is the Gil and Frank Mustin Professor
of Economics at Swarthmore College.
A significantly revised and updated version of this chapter, using new data, new econometric techniques, and with a new coauthor (Muzhe Yang) was published in the Journal of
Development Economics (March 2014: vol. 107, 1–16.). This research was partially funded by
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Africa Project. We would like to thank
participants at seminars at the Center for Global Development, National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), Northeast Universities Development Economic Conference (NEUDC),
Université de Clermont-Ferrand, and University of Gottingen for their helpful comments and
suggestions. All errors are our own. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and
disclosure of the author’s or authors’ material financial relationships, if any, please see http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c13438.ack.
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Answers to these questions that are based on the volume of trade are
mixed. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) show that the level of trade among
African countries is actually higher than that predicted by a gravity model.
But other research suggests that intra-African trade is too low, due to internal political tensions and mismanagement of economic policies (Longo and
Sekkat 2004). Oyejide, Elbadawi, and Collier (1997) observe that competing
national priorities have repeatedly undermined formal attempts at regional
integration in Africa, while Azam (2007) stresses the role of informal trade
in arbitraging the cross-border price differences created by divergent national trade policies.
In this chapter, we address the impact of political borders on intra-African
trade by focusing on prices rather than trade volumes.1 We consider prices of
two staple grains (millet and sorghum) and one cash crop (cowpeas) in markets in Niger and Nigeria. We look at price dispersion in cross-border markets as compared to price dispersions in different markets within the same
country. This follows the strand of empirical literature that compares price
dispersion in spatially separated markets in industrial countries. Results in
that literature show that price dispersion is larger when, conditional on distance, two markets are on either side of an international border than when
they are in the same country. The seminal contribution by Engel and Rogers
(1996), and subsequent work on other industrialized countries, such as the
United States and Japan (Parsley and Wei 2001) and EU countries (Crucini,
Shintani, and Tsuruga 2010; Crucini, Telmer, and Zachariadis 2005), has
consistently found a relatively large border effect.2
In this chapter, we show that there is a statistically significant border effect,
that is, conditional price dispersion is higher between a market in Niger and
Nigeria than between two markets in Niger, or two markets in Nigeria. But
this border effect is much lower than what has been found for industrial
countries. Furthermore, we also show that the border effect is lower if the
cross-border markets share a common ethnic profile, while the effect of ethnicity is to raise conditional price dispersion between two ethnically distinct
1. Border effects in low-income countries have not been the subject of much research, partly
due to the lack of high-frequency data on narrowly defined goods. Cross-border comparisons
have typically been restricted to a small number of locations and over a limited time period.
Daubrée (1995) compares the prices of a range of consumer goods between Niamey (the capital of Niger), Maradi (Niger), and Kano (Nigeria), and finds tighter comovements between
Maradi and Kano than between Maradi and Niamey. Oyejide, Ogunkola, and Bankole et al.
(2005) compare prices for markets within Nigeria with those in between the capitals of Niger,
Togo, and Benin, and finds suggestive evidence of a border effect. Araujo-Bonjean, Aubert,
and Egg (2008), use a vector autoregression model to estimate integration of millet prices
between countries within the CFA zone (Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso), and find a statistically significant border effect.
2. As discussed in more detail below, Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) have shown that these
estimates overstate the border effect when they do not take into account underlying differences
in price heterogeneity between countries.
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markets in Niger. We also show that the presence of mobile phones mitigates
the international border effect, which extends the intra-Niger results in Aker
(2010) to an international setting.
The results presented here offer a positive message with regard to ongoing
efforts to integrate West African economies. These countries have attempted
to foster trade and economic integration through a system of monetary
and trade unions such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(or UEMOA), a customs and monetary union created in 1994 that shares
a common currency (the CFA franc) and a common external tariff.3 The
UEMOA is also part of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), a regional integration initiative created in 2001 among all West
African states. More specifically for the two countries studied in this chapter,
the National Boundary Commission of Nigeria and a Nigeria–Niger Joint
Commission (NNJC) have convened transborder workshops to address
issues of cross-border trade. Our results with respect to the effect of the
border on price dispersion suggest the positive potential of these efforts.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a
context for our analysis by discussing some relevant characteristics of Niger,
including the establishment of its international border with Nigeria and the
geographic nature of its ethnic divisions. Section 6.3 describes the data we
use and provides some preliminary statistics. Section 6.4 present an analysis of the international border effect based on conditional distributions,
while section 6.5 analyzes the market-pair data using regressions. Section
6.6 presents the results for internal borders. We offer some conclusions in
section 6.7.
6.2

Niger and Its Trade

Niger is a large, sparsely populated, landlocked country in West Africa.
The majority of its population consists of rural subsistence farmers who
depend upon rain-fed agriculture as their main source of food and income. It
is one of the poorest countries in the world. It was ranked last on the United
Nations’ 2009 Human Development Index.
The primary trading partner of Niger is its southern neighbor, Nigeria,
a coastal country that has the largest population in Africa. The 1,500 km
border between Niger (a former French colony) and Nigeria (a former British colony) was established by the French and the British in 1906. The border
separated the Hausa, Zarma, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups between the
two countries. As shown in figure 6.1, the border drawn by the colonial powers also created a Niger that included eight ethnic groups (Hausa, Songhai/
3. The CFA franc was created in 1945, and was devalued in 1948 and 1994 (changing the relative value of the CFA franc to the French franc). The current CFA franc is pegged to the euro.
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International borders and ethnic groups in Niger and northern Nigeria

Notes: A map of the ethnic and international borders for Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger,
and Nigeria. Created from the authors’ household and trader-level data collected between
2005 and 2007, as well as secondary data for markets in Burkina Faso and Mali.

Zarma, Toureg, Fulani, Kanuri, Arab, Toubou, and Gourmantche) which
were, for the most part, situated in geographically distinct regions of the
country.4
The border between Niger and Nigeria was porous and haphazardly
patrolled at the time the two countries achieved independence in 1960.
Smuggling was a major economic activity.5 Trade between the two countries was primarily in agropastoral products such as grains, legumes, and
livestock (Collins 1976), but “unofficial traders” also brought petroleum
and farm-chemical products into Niger (Charlick 1991). There have been
4. A map of Nigeria in 1957–1958 (not shown) also suggests that the geographic location
of ethnic groups in Niger and Nigeria seems to be time invariant, as it is similar to the ethnographic maps for 2008.
5. Azam (2007) provides an analytical treatment of the determinants of illegal cross-border
trade in the region.
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efforts since the early 1970s to harmonize the relationship between the two
countries and remove official obstacles to trade. Currently, both countries
are members of ECOWAS.
The sample period studied in this chapter is 1999–2007. There were no
official trade restrictions or border closings during this time (although there
had been border closings in 1983 and 1986, linked to political instability
in Nigeria). There are, however, other possible sources of costs of trade
between these countries. Nigerien-Nigerian trade could be hampered by
costs due to delays, harassment, or banditry. Furthermore, trade between
these two countries could be impeded by costs associated with changing
currencies between the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc of
Niger and the Nigerian naira. There are also linguistic differences, both
between the official languages of Niger and Nigeria (French and English,
respectively), and in local languages in different regions of each country.
6.3

Data

The motivation for using prices in different locations to test for the presence of an international border is straightforward; if borders impose costs
that undermine trade, then, conditional on distance between markets and
other location-specific factors, price differences between markets located in
different countries should be larger than those between markets in the same
country. Thus our analysis requires both price data and other data used to
control for distances between markets and location-specific features in Niger
and Nigeria.
The analysis in this chapter uses a data set that draws on both primary and
secondary sources in Niger and Nigeria. The price data consist of monthly
observations of prices of two grains (millet and sorghum) and a cash crop
(cowpeas) over a nine-year period (1999–2007) across forty-eight domestic
and cross-border markets.6 Each of these commodities is produced and consumed in both countries, is heavily traded on an annual basis, and is fairly
homogeneous in terms of quality.
Time-series data on gas prices, mobile phone coverage, rainfall, road quality, trade flows, district population levels, mobile phone rollout and coverage,
and the official naira-CFA exchange rate were also collected. In addition
to these time series, we employ data on the latitude and longitude of each
market, the location of the international border, and the road distances
between market pairs. These series enable us to calculate the distance to the
international and internal border of each market in the data set, as well as
the Euclidean distances and actual road distances between market pairs.
6. Grain prices were collected by Niger’s agricultural marketing information system, which
converted prices in Nigerian markets into CFA using the CFA/naira exchange rate of that day.
We do not have access to the original price data in naira, nor to the daily CFA/naira exchange
rates used for the price conversion.
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Our analysis also uses a unique panel survey of traders, farmers, transporters, and market resource persons collected in Niger by Aker between
2005 and 2007. The survey data draw on interviews with 415 traders and 205
farmers located in thirty-five markets and forty villages across six geographic
regions of Niger, as well as in five Nigerian markets. A census of all grain
traders was conducted in each market, in which traders and market-resource
persons who participated in the survey provided detailed information about
their demographic and socioeconomic background and commercial operations. These data allow us to construct measures of the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) for each market, village, and region, to identify ethnic
“borders,” and to measure the number of traders operating in these markets
over time.
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics for markets located within a 150 km
Table 6.1

Comparison of observables by country (Niger-Nigeria)
Unconditional mean

Difference in means

Observables

Mean (s. d.)

Mean (s. d.)

Difference (s. e.)

A. Market-pair-level data
Distance between markets (km)
Road quality between markets
Mobile phone coverage (2007)
Transport costs between markets (CFA/kg)

Niger-Niger
375.29(207)
.37(.49)
.89(.32)
12.35(6.72)

Nigeria-Nigeria
369(271)
.6(.52)
.6(.52)
12.19(6.67)

B. Market-level data
Millet price level (CFA/kg)
Sorghum price level (CFA/kg)
Cowpea price level (CFA/kg)
Ethnic composition of traders
Hausa
Zarma
Kanuri
Road quality to market
Market size
Mobile phone coverage (2007)
Drought between 1999 and 2007
Urban center(> = 35,000)

Niger
124.33(33)
119(36)
173(56)

Nigeria
112.96(31)
104(34.8)
176 (56)

11.37***(1.83)
14.35***(2.04)
–3.21(3.36)

.58(.51)
.29(.464)
.08(.27)
.71(.46)
105.08(90)
.95(.020)
.027(.162)
.35(.49)

.8(.447)
0
.2 (.447)
.75(.5)
176.75(149)
.8(.447)
.025(.156)
0.8 (.45)

–.21(.21)
.29***(.096)
–.12(.19)
.041(.25)
–71.66(69)
.158(.19)
.002(.007)
.45*(.21)

6.29(65)
–.22(.16)
.29*(.16)
.16(.22)

Notes: Data are from secondary sources and the Niger trader survey collected by Aker. In panel A, “Niger” market pairs are pairs where both markets are located in Niger; “border” market pairs are those
pairs where both markets are located in a border country (Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso). In panel B,
“Niger” markets are those that are located within Niger (150 km from the international border), whereas
“border” markets are those markets located outside of Niger (but within 150 km of the border). HuberWhite robust standard errors clustered by market-pair month (panel A) and by market month (panel B)
are in parentheses. Prices are in CFA francs, deflated by the Nigerien Consumer Price Index. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test tests for the equality of the distribution functions.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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radius of the Niger-Nigeria border. In general, prices for staple grains (millet and sorghum) are higher in Niger than in Nigeria, with a statistically
significant difference between the two. This is consistent with the direction
of trade between the two countries, with Niger importing grains from Nigeria. By contrast, cowpea prices are lower in Niger; while the difference is
not statistically significant, the point estimate is as expected since Niger
primarily exports to Nigeria. We do not reject the equality of means or
distributions for most other observable characteristics, with the exception
of mobile phone coverage and the prevalence of the Zarma ethnic group.
However, the difference in mobile phone coverage as of 2007 is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In addition, the Nigerian markets in
our sample are only located in the Hausa region of that country, and none
are in Nigeria’s Zarma region.7
6.4

Analysis of Distributions

Our first analysis of the international border effect for markets in Niger
and Nigeria uses the data described above to construct kernel distributions
for conditional price differences across countries and within countries. We
estimate regressions of the form:
(1)

(

)

i
ln pijt / pkt
= b0 + b1X jkt + ut + a jk + ´ jkt ,

i
where pijt and pkt
are the CFA franc prices of good i in markets j and k at
time t, deflated by Niger’s consumer price index. The regressors in this specification include Xjkt, a vector of observable characteristics that affect price
dispersion between two markets, including transport costs between markets
j and k at time t, a dummy variable that equals 1 if one and only one of the
two markets is urban, and another dummy variable that equals 1 if one and
only one had a drought at time t. The variable θαt represents time fixed
effects. In some specifications market-pair fixed effects, αjk, are also included.
Separate regressions are run for market pairs within each country, and
also for cross-border pairs. We plot a kernel distribution of the residuals jkt
from each regression, to examine relative conditional deviations from the
Law of One Price.
Figures 6.2A, 6.2B, and 6.2C present the kernel distributions of jkt from
a regression of equation (1) for millet, sorghum, and cowpeas, respectively,
for the entire 1999–2007 period. Each of these three figures includes the
kernel distribution for the residuals of a regression using intra-Niger market pairs, a regression using intra-Nigeria market pairs, and a regression
using cross-border (Niger-Nigeria) market pairs. Visual inspection of the

7. While members of the Zarma ethnic group live within Nigeria, they represent a small
percentage of the population (approximately 88,000 people, or less than .0007 percent) and
are geographically focused in the far northwestern region of the country, on the border with
Benin and Niger (the Birin n’Kebbi region).

Fig. 6.2A Kernel distributions of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas for Niger and
Nigeria (1999–2006), ln price difference for intranational and cross-border pairs:
Millet pairs < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), urban, drought

Fig. 6.2B Kernel distributions of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas for Niger and
Nigeria (1999–2006), ln price differences for intranational and cross-border market
pairs: Sorghum pairs < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), urban, drought
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Fig. 6.2C Kernel distributions of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas for Niger and
Nigeria (1999–2006), ln price differences for intranational and cross-border market
pairs: Cowpeas pairs < 300km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), urban, drought

kernel distributions suggests that the underlying volatilities of market-pair
price differentials are similar across countries for grains and cowpeas. The
distributions show a modest horizontal displacement across countries, suggesting that even if there is a statistically significant border effect, it may not
be economically important.
These cross-sectional results, however, may mask differences across time.
In particular, we are interested in investigating whether exchange rate movements between the naira and CFA franc alter relative prices, which would
be consistent with a lack of full-market integration across the international
border. There was a strong appreciation of the CFA franc relative to the
naira between 1999 and 2001 and 2002 and 2004.8 If cross-border markets
were not well integrated, we would expect to see increases in the price of
millet, sorghum, and cowpeas in Niger relative to those in Nigeria during
these periods.9
To investigate conditional price dispersion over time, we estimate equation
(1) for cross-border pairs separately for three marketing years (1999/2000,
2000/2001, and 2001/2002) using the observed price differences (rather than
absolute values, as above) between Niger and Nigeria for millet, sorghum,
and cowpeas, and plot the kernel distributions of the residuals from these
8. There was a 16 percent appreciation of the CFA against the naira between 1999 and 2001.
9. Gopinath et al. (2009) find that relative costs of similar goods in Canada and the United
States closely track the exchange rate.
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Fig. 6.3A Kernel distributions for Niger-Nigeria market pairs by year (1999–
2001), ln P(Niger) – ln P(Nigeria): Millet residuals on drought, distance < 100 km

regressions in figures 6.3A, 6.3B, and 6.3C. Figures 6.3A and 6.3B show
a rightward shift in the distributions of millet and sorghum, respectively,
between 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, the period during which there was an
appreciation of the CFA/naira exchange rate. This suggests that relative
prices follow the CFA franc-naira exchange rate, which could reflect a lack
of market integration. A more formal test of market integration is offered
by the regression analysis presented in the next section.
6.5

Regression Analysis

In this section we present a more precise analysis of the border effect,
following the method of an early and influential contribution to this literature, Engel and Rogers (1996). They compare price dispersion for fourteen
categories of goods among 228 market pairs (each pair represents two cities
in the United States, two cities in Canada, or one in the United States and
the other in Canada) through regressions with the specification:
N

(2)

sij = b1 ln ( dij ) + b2 Bij + ∑ gm Dm + ´ij
m=1

where σij is a measure of price dispersion between cities i and j, dij is the
distance between these cities, Bij equals 1 if cities i and j are in different
countries and 0 otherwise, and Dm is a set of city-specific dummy variables.

Fig. 6.3B Kernel distributions for Niger-Nigeria market pairs by year (1999–
2001), ln P(Niger) – ln P(Nigeria): Sorghum residuals on drought, distance
< 100 km

Fig. 6.3C Kernel distributions for Niger-Nigeria market pairs by year (1999–
2001), ln P(Niger) – ln P(Nigeria): Cowpeas residuals on drought, distance
< 100 km
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The estimated coefficient β2 represents the conditional change in price dispersion between two cities due to the fact that they are in different countries.
The estimated border effect, that is, the distance-equivalent effect of the
border, is exp(b1 / b2 ) .
Engel and Rogers find strikingly large effects of the international border
on price dispersion; one estimate puts the distance-equivalent effect at over
70,000 km. Other research reports similar magnitudes for border effects
between industrial countries. But Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) show
that differences in underlying price volatility in two countries can result in
an upwardly biased estimate of the border effect, since comparing crosscountry pairs of prices reflects both differences in underlying price variability in one of the countries as compared to the other as well as the costs
associated with crossing the border between the countries. They demonstrate that the inclusion of a dummy variable for pairs of locations within
one country can result in very different estimates than those obtained when
including a dummy variable for pairs of locations in the other country, if
there are wide differences in price volatility across the two countries. For
example, with the Engel and Rogers data, the estimated distance-equivalent
border effect based on a specification that includes a Canada-Canada fixed
effect is 47 km while the one based on a specification that includes a United
States-United States fixed effect is 108 million km.
The Gorodnichenko and Tesar effect might be expected to be less of a
concern for our analysis than for that of Engel and Rogers since, as shown in
figures 6.2A, 6.2B, and 6.2C, the distribution of absolute price differences for
Niger-Niger pairs differs very little from the distribution for Nigeria-Nigeria
pairs. As will be shown, this conjecture is supported by a comparison of
border effects between regressions that include a dummy variable for NigerNiger pairs and those that use a dummy variable for Nigeria-Nigeria pairs.
To implement the Engel-Rogers approach, we estimate a version of equation (1) with a dummy variable for cross-border market pairs,
N

(3)

i
ln( pijt pkt
) = b1B jk + b2 X jkt + ∑ gm Dm + ut + ´ jkt
m=1

where Bjk and Dm are defined as above, Xjkt is a vector of variables that might
affect price dispersion between two markets, such as drought, road quality,
transport costs, and other time-varying factors, and θt is a vector of monthly
fixed effects. One version of this specification does not include a binary
variable for country-specific pairs. In light of the Gorodnochenko-Tesar
critique, we estimate two additional versions, one containing an indicator
variable that equals 1 if both locations in the pair are in Niger, and the other
containing an indicator variable that equals 1 if both locations in the pair
are in Nigeria.
Table 6.2 shows the results of the regressions that take the form of equation (3). There is a separate panel for each of the three commodities. Column

No
Yes
21,460
0.0797

No
Yes
21,460
0.0797

.026***
(.002)
.045***
(.002)
.004
(.007)
–.009***
(.001)
.002
(.008)

(2)

No
Yes
21,460
0.0897

–.002
(.008)

.026***
(.002)
.045***
(.002)
.004
(.007)
–.009***
(.001)

(3)

–.005**
(.002)
.020***
(.004)
No
Yes
21,460
0.0801
.040**
(.004)

.020***
(.003)
.045***
(.002)
.004
(.007)
–.009***
(.001)

(4)

No
Yes
15,662
0.1081

.023***
(.003)
.036***
(.003)
.046***
(.011)
–.008***
(.002)

(1)

No
Yes
15,662
0.1081

.021***
(.003)
.036***
(.003)
.045***
(.011)
–.008***
(.002)
.001
(.011)

(2)

(3)

No
Yes
15,662
0.1081

–.001
(.011)

.024***
(.003)
.036***
(.003)
.045***
(.011)
–.008***
(.002)

Sorghum

–.015***
(.003)
.008
(.005)
No
Yes
15,662
0.1091
.032***
(.005)

.024***
(.003)
.036***
(.003)
.046***
(.011)
–.008***
(.002)

(4)

No
Yes
20,421
0.1036

.029***
(.003)
.063***
(.003)
–.040***
(.009)
–.009***
(.002)

(1)

No
Yes
20,421
0.1036

.029***
(.003)
.063***
(.003)
–.040***
(.009)
–.009***
(.002)

(2)

(3)

No
Yes
20,421
0.1036

–.006
(.010)

.029***
(.003)
.063***
(.003)
–.040***
(.009)
–.009***
(.002)

Cowpeas

–.030***
(.003)
.004
(.007)
No
Yes
20,421
0.1097
.027***
(.006)

.023***
(.003)
.063***
(.003)
–.036***
(.009)
–.011***
(.002)

(4)

Notes: Data are from secondary sources and the Niger trader survey collected by Aker. Additional covariates include the presence of drought, mobile phone coverage, and urban
status. All regressions are clustered by month to correct for spatial dependence between markets over time.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.

Market-pair fixed effects
Monthly time dummy
No. of observations
R-squared
Joint effect of border and
interaction

.026***
(.002)
.045***
(.002)
.004
(.007)
–.009***
(.001)

(1)

Millet

Estimated international border effects

Border * cell phone coverage

Cell phone coverage

Nigeria market

Niger market

Urban status

Drought dummy

Transport costs

Niger-Nigeria border

Dependent variable:
|ln ( Pit/Pjt)|

Table 6.2
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(1) of each panel shows that the international border is associated with a
statistically significant increase in price dispersion for each of the three commodities, contributing a 2.6 percent increase in price dispersion for millet,
a 2.3 percent increase for sorghum, and a 2.9 percent increase for cowpeas.
The magnitude and statistical significance of the border effect is robust to
the inclusion of a binary variable that identifies Niger-Niger market pairs
(column [2] in each panel) and another that identifies Nigeria-Nigeria market pairs (column [3] in each panel), suggesting that country-specific differences in price dispersion are not driving our results.10
The border effect could arise for a number of reasons. One reason is associated with the difficulty in obtaining timely information on prices across an
international border. Aker (2010) has shown that, within Niger, the advent
of mobile phone coverage led to a reduction in price dispersion. Does the
same effect hold across the Niger-Nigeria border?
Evidence presented in column (4) of each panel shows that the mobilephone effect does, in fact, hold internationally, as well as within countries.
Column (4) augments the basic specification (in column [1]) with two binary
variables. The first binary variable is equal to 1 if both markets have mobile
phone coverage at time t, and is otherwise 0. The second is an interaction
of the mobile phone coverage variable with the border dummy variable.
In this specification, the excluded category is internal markets that do not
have mobile phone coverage. The coefficient on the border dummy variable
therefore represents the border effect for markets that cannot communicate
by mobile phone (because at least one of the markets is not covered by
mobile phone service), while the coefficient on the mobile phone coverage
variable represents the effect of mobile phone coverage on internal market
pairs. The border effect for market pairs that can communicate by mobile
phone is given by the sum of the coefficients on the border dummy variable
and the interaction variable.
The estimates presented in column (4) of each panel of table 6.2 show
that mobile phone coverage is associated with a statistically significant
decrease in price dispersion across internal markets for all three commodities.11 Although mobile phones reduce price dispersion for internal market
pairs, the border still “matters” for all commodities, even between markets
that can communicate by mobile phone, since the joint effect of the border
dummy variable and the interaction term remains positive and statistically
significant. Not surprisingly, the border effect remains significant for market
pairs that cannot communicate by mobile phone, again for all three com10. As discussed by Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009), it is impossible to include the border dummy variable and both market-pair dummy variables because of multicollinearity. The
results presented in this table are all robust to the use of dyadic standard errors.
11. Aker (2010) finds the introduction of mobile phones was associated with a negative and
statistically significant reduction in price dispersion across millet markets within Niger, and that
this effect was the strongest for markets located between 200 and 550 km apart.
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modities, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on the border
dummy variable in the column (4) estimates.
6.6

Price Dispersion across Ethnic Regions in Niger

There has been a growing interest recently in economic research investigating the role that ethnic or cultural diversity can play in explaining socioeconomic outcomes. A number of empirical studies have found that ethnic
diversity is associated with lower growth rates (Easterly and Levine 1997),
more corruption (Mauro 1995), lower contributions to local public goods
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), and lower participation in groups and
associations (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). In this section, we contribute
to this stream of research by investigating whether ethnic diversity creates
“internal borders” to trade, and hence market segmentation.
The process through which borders were established in West Africa
resulted in multiple ethnic groups within Niger, as noted above. Also, as
mentioned earlier, these ethnic groups generally live in geographically distinct regions of the country. We focus on two of the major ethnic groups in
Niger, the Hausa and the Zarma, and consider whether there is a statistically
significant and economically meaningful “border” between the regions they
inhabit in Niger.
We identify the Hausa and Zarma regions of Niger through the use of
both secondary and primary data on the ethnic composition of geographic
locations within the country. We use the degree of ethnic diversity across
locations to locate the ethnic Hausa/Zarma border as a linear spline running
roughly south to north that separates two geographic locations with a low
degree of ethnic diversity (i.e., a strong majority of Hausa or Zarma). Markets on the “border” are omitted from the analysis; they have a higher degree
of ethnic diversity, that is, a more even mix between Hausa and Zarma, than
markets on either side of the border.12
Having identified an intra-Niger ethnic border, we now analyze its economic consequences for price dispersion using the two methods employed
above to study the effects of the Niger-Nigeria border. We begin with a
graphical analysis. Figures 6.4A, 6.4B, and 6.4C show the kernel distributions of the jkt of a specification like equation (1) but with a distinction
between the Hausa and Zarma regions of Niger rather than the countries
of Niger and Nigeria. In this case, the distinction is made between HausaHausa market pairs in Niger, Zarma-Zarma market pairs in Niger, and
12. The measure of ethnic diversity used almost universally in the empirical literature is
the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF ), which is a decreasing transformation of
the Herfindahl concentration index. In particular, if we consider a society composed of K ≥
2 different ethnic groups and let pk indicate the share of group k in the total population, the
resulting value of the ELF index is given by 1 – ∑(pk)2. Thus, a lower value of the ELF index
indicates a higher degree of ethnic homogeneity.

Fig. 6.4A Kernel distributions for Zarma and Hausa market pairs. Absolute ln
price differences: Millet, intra-Niger, < 300km: Residuals on ln(TC), urban, drought

Fig. 6.4B Kernel distributions for Zarma and Hausa market pairs. Absolute ln
price differences: Sorghum, intra-Niger, < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs),
urban, drought
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Fig. 6.4C Kernel distributions for Zarma and Hausa market pairs. Absolute ln
price differences: Cowpeas, intra-Niger, < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs),
urban, drought

cross-ethnic-border pairs that include one location in the Hausa region of
Niger and the other in the Zarma region. These kernel distributions suggest that the underlying price dispersions for millet, sorghum, and cowpeas
in each region are similar but, unlike the kernel distributions for NigerNigeria market pairs, the distribution of price dispersion between Zarma
and Hausa markets seems markedly different than the distributions for intraHausa and intra-Zarma market pairs. This suggests that the internal HausaZarma border may have greater consequences for price dispersion within
Niger than the Nigerian border does for price dispersion between the two
countries.
Regression estimates confirm this impression. The three panels of table
6.3 present the regression estimates of equation (3) for each commodity
although, in this case, the sample only includes market-pair data from the
Hausa and Zarma regions of Niger and the “border” represents the intraNiger division between these two regions. These regression results show that
this internal border is associated with a positive and statistically significant
increase in price dispersion for each commodity. Column (1) of each panel
shows that the internal ethnic border between the Hausa and Zarma regions
is significant for all three commodities. The magnitude of this intranational
ethnic border effect exceeds that of the international border effect in all
cases; the estimated ethnic border effect is more than double the international border effect for millet, more than 60 percent larger for cowpeas, and
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0.0873

No
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.061***
(.006)
.040***
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(.006)
.040***
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.009***
(.002)
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.030***
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(.005)

.026***
(.003)
.052***
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.060***
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No
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–.024**
(.011)
–.006**
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Notes: Data are from secondary sources and the Niger trader survey collected by Aker. Cell phone dummy = 1 in period t when both markets have cell phone coverage, 0 otherwise.
Drought dummy = 1 in period t when one market in a pair has rainfall less than or equal to two standard deviations below its average rainfall level during the rainy season, or fifteen
consecutive days without rainfall during the rainy season, 0 otherwise. Urban status = 1 if one market in a pair is an urban center (> = 35,000 people), 0 if both or neither are urban
centers. Regressions include all market pairs no more than 250 km apart. Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by market-pair month (price difference) are in parentheses.
All prices are in CFA francs deflated by the Nigerien Consumer Price Index.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.

Constant
Market-pair fixed effects
Monthly time dummy
No. of observations
R2
Joint effect of border and
interaction

.056***
(.006)
.041***
(.003)
.009
(.011)
–.006***
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(1)

Millet

Estimated internal border effects

Border * cell phone coverage
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Zarma market

Hausa market

Urban status
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Transport costs

Hausa-Zarma border

Dependent variable:
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Table 6.3
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more than 10 percent larger for sorghum. As with the estimates presented in
table 6.2, the significance of these results is robust to the inclusion of regionspecific fixed effects for intra-Hausa (column [2]) and intra-Zarma (column
[3]) market pairs, although the value of the effect is sensitive to the inclusion
of these fixed effects in the case of cowpeas. This is consistent with the visual
inspection of the kernel distributions in figure 6.4C, which suggested that the
underlying price dispersion for cowpeas differed considerably in intra-Hausa
and intra-Zarma regions.
Mobile phone coverage diminishes price dispersion within regions. In
all three panels in table 6.3, the coefficient on the mobile phone coverage
variable is significant and negative, suggesting that mobile phones reduce
price dispersion within the Hausa region and within the Zarma region (Aker
2010). The magnitude of this reduction is notable, and equal to 1.2 percent
for millet, 1.7 percent for sorghum, and 4.4 percent for cowpeas. But there
is less evidence that the reduction in price dispersion occurs across markets
on either side of the internal ethnic border: the joint effect of the mobile
phone dummy variable and the interaction term is negative and statistically
significant for sorghum. While this suggests that mobile phones are less useful across ethnic regions than within them, the result may be confounded to
some degree with a nonlinear effect of distance. The cross-border market
pairs in these regressions are less than 250 km apart, and Aker (2010) found
that mobile phones reduced price dispersion primarily for medium-haul
markets, namely, those between 200 and 500 km apart. The joint effect of
the border and interaction term, capturing the impact of the internal border
on markets connected by mobile phones, remains positive and statistically
significant for all specifications.
We might be concerned about potential bias due to correlation between
the internal border effect and unobserved covariates. The lower panel of
table 6.4 tests for the equality of means of market-level covariates on either
side of the internal border. We fail to find evidence of a statistically significant difference for most market-level covariates, including market size, the
frequency of drought, road quality, distance between markets, and urban
status. The notable exception is mobile phone coverage, with a strong statistically significant difference between the two groups.
6.7

Conclusion

This chapter began by asking whether international market integration is
feasible in sub-Saharan Africa. We find evidence of an international border
effect between Niger and Nigeria, but the magnitude of this effect is much
smaller than that found in industrialized countries. Thus, the border does
not pose a deep threat to the success of existing regional economic commissions that have attempted to foster cross-border trade, even when two
countries do not share a common currency. These results suggest that the
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Table 6.4

Comparison of observables by ethnicity (within Niger)
Unconditional mean

Observables

Mean (s. d.)

Mean (s. d.)

A. Market-pair-level data
Distance between markets (km)
Road quality between markets
Cell phone coverage
Transport costs between markets (CFA/kg)

Hausa-Hausa
234.08(134)
.43(.49)
.81(.39)
8.08(4.34)

Zarma-Zarma
216.42(161)
.41(.49)
.98(.12)
7.54(5.06)

B. Market-level data
Millet price level (CFA/kg)
Sorghum price level (CFA/kg)
Cowpeas price level (CFA/kg)
Road quality to market
Market size
Cell phone coverage (2007)
Drought between 1999–2007
Urban center(> = 35,000)

Hausa
123.23(30)
112.84(32)
162.58(48.97)
.87(.35)
107.63(86)
.43(.50)
.031(.174)
.5(.53)

Zarma
139.01(32)
134.82(36)
197.94(55)
.6(.52)
70.1(50)
.35(.48)
.031(.174)
.4(.52)

Difference in means
Unconditional s. e.
17.66(21.54)
.02(.07)
–.17***(.03)
.53***(.07)
–15.77***(1.56)
–21.98***(1.90)
–35.37***(2.60)
.28(.21)
37.53(34.43)
.08***(.02)
–.0000(.008)
.1(.25)

Notes: Data are from secondary sources and the Niger trader survey collected by Aker. In panel A,
“Hausa” market pairs are pairs where both markets are located in Hausa regions of Niger, and “Zarma”
market pairs are pairs where both markets are located in the Zarma region of Niger. In panel B, “Hausa”
markets are markets with a majority of Hausa traders within Niger, and “Zarma” markets are markets
with a majority of Zarma traders within Niger. Huber-White robust standard errors are clustered by
market-pair month (panel A), and market month (panel B) are in parentheses. All prices are CFA francs
deflated by the Nigerien Consumer Price Index. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test tests for the equality of
the distribution functions.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.

Walrasian auctioneer can be heard across the Niger-Nigeria border. Her
voice carries especially well within her ethnic community, or with the aid of
a mobile phone.
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